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Case Summaries
CERCLA
Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Vacuum
Tanks, Inc., 75 F.3d 1048 (5th Cir.
1996)
This case involved a waste transporter
seeking indemnification from its insurer for
three lawsuits stemming from pollution
damage and cleanup of its dumping activities. The insurer of Vacuum Tanks, Inc.
(wI), a transporter of liquid waste, was
Bituminous Casualty Corp. (Bituminous).
Seeking a declaratory judgment that
would release it from any duty to pay for
either a defense or indemnification, Bituminous filed suit against VTI. VTI counterclaimed, charging that Bituminous had a
duty to defend and reimburse VTI for defense costs, and asked the court to grant
punitive damages for bad faith in denial
of coverage. VTI also sought a declaratory judgment.
The issue between the parties was
that neither VTl nor Bituminous could find
a copy of the annual policies that WI had
purchased, though Bituminous was able
to locate a "specimen policy" for the
1959-1965 period of coverage. The
trial court ruled in favor of VTI but found
Bituminous not liable for bad faith. On
appeal, the court found VTI did not present sufficient evidence to prove the terms
of the policies involving coverage of the
claims. The case was remanded for further trial proceedings in which VTI was
again awarded defense costs, plus prejudgment interest and attorney's fees.
In the instant appeal, Bituminous
again contended that VT presented insufficient evidence of the terms of the policies.
WI's evidence included the
specimen policy of the period in question
as well as testimony, internal memos and
records. The appellate court rejected Bituminous' argument and held that the trial
court did not err in finding that the policy
terms of VTI's coverage matched those of
the specimen policy based on the

232

MELPR

evidence presented.
On Bituminous' contention that it had
no duty to defend, the appellate court
referred to the fact that the specimen policy provided liability coverage for damages caused by destruction or injury to
property incurred in an accident. Bituminous first charged that there was no property damage because Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA) claims do not
constitute property damage for insurance
coverage. In applying Texas insurance
law on the duty to defend, which is biased toward the insured in policy interpretation, the appellate court found that
duty to be present in all three claims
against VTI.
In the alternative, Bituminous argued
that it had no duty to provide coverage
because no accident occurred since VTIs
transportation of waste was a voluntary
and intentional activity. The court disagreed, holding Texas law focused on
whether the damages and injuries incurred were accidental, not whether the
conduct or actions were accidental.
The appellate court did, however,
modify the trial court's award of attorney's fees to VTIL Bituminous proved on
remand that it was exempt from the payment of attorney's fees because it was a
stock property casualty company. The
court of appeals held that the Texas
Code exempted contracts issued by insurers subject to the Unfair Claim Settlement
Practices Act, which includes stock and
casualty companies.
-

by Wendy Hickey

CLEAN AIR ACT
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Environmental Protection Agency, Nos.
94-1044, 94-1062, 1996 WL 184480
(D.C. Cir. Apr. i9, 1996)
In
November
1993,
the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
published two rules designed to help federal
agencies determine
whether
"Metropolitan Planning Organizations"
were in compliance with Section 176 of
the Clean Air Act. Six environmental
groups (Environmental Defense Fund)
sought review of these regulations, claiming that several inconsistencies existed
between the EPA regulations and the provisions of the Clean Air Act.
The first challenge presented by the
Environmental Defense Fund was aimed
at a grandfather clause in the EPA regulations. The EPA regulations required a determination that a metropolitan project
complied with the Clean Air Act before a
federal agency could become involved in
the project. The grandfather clause, however, exempted non-transportation projects that had been analyzed under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
within the preceding five years and transportation projects that had undergone
such analysis within the preceding three
years.
The Environmental Defense Fund argued that this grandfather provision was
in conflict with Sections 176(c)(1) and
(c)(2) of the Clean Air Act. The court rejected this argument, stating that the
Clean Air Act "vests the Agency with discretion" to establish the frequency with
which project conformity will be determined as long as determinations for transportation plans are not less frequent that
every three years. Because the grandfather clause only exempted projects which
had undergone NEPA review within the
previous three years, the court upheld the
grandfather clause as a reasonable exercise of agency discretion.
The Environmental Defense Fund next
challenged the validity of EPA regulations
allowing for the approval of a state transportation improvement program (TIP) although the program's transportation
control measures (TCMs) were behind the
schedule set out in the state's implementation plan (SIP). They argued that the
Clean Air Act required the schedules to
be consistent. The court rejected this
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challenge, holding that the Clean Air Act
did not require exact correspondence between the schedules of the TIP, the TCM
and the SIP, but only required that the
The court
schedules be compatible.
conclusion
would
stated that a contrary
require reading the Clean Air Act's consistency requirement too narrowly. The
court also rejected the Environmental Defense Fund's argument that the TCMs
would not be eligible for federal funding
without a timely implementation schedule,
since the court found the statute to be ambiguous and subject to reasonable interpretation by EPA.
Alternatively, the Environmental Defense Fund argued that the EPA regulations were in violation of Section 176(c)
of the Clean Water Act, which states that
SIPs are in conformity with the Act only if
they "contribute to annual emissions reductions." They argued that the EPA
regulations were contrary to this section
of the Clean Water Act because, under
the regulations, it was possible for a
transportation plan or improvement plan
to conform with the Clean Air Act even if
it did not produce demonstrable emissions reductions, as long as they were
part of an over-arching plan that would
result in a reduction of emissions. The
court held that the "contribute to" language in Section 176(c) was ambiguous.
Once again the court stated that if the
EPA's statutory interpretation was reasonable, the court had to give it deference.
The next challenge by the Environmental Defense Fund was aimed at EPA's
definition of "transportation projects,"
which included only highway or transit
projects, arguing that Congress intended
to include all manner of transportation.
The court also rejected this argument
based on the fact that metropolitan planning organizations did not have the ability to control air, rail, or water
Section
Because
transportation.
2
176(c)( ) focuses on metropolitan planning organizations, the court found that it
was reasonable to conclude that its rules
applied only to transportation modes over
which they have control.

The Environmental Defense Fund then
took issue with EPA's definition of
"indirect" emissions, arguing that under
the definition, emissions that were a foreseeable result of federal action would be
exempt. The court was not persuaded by
this argument and held that EPA's definition was consistent with the requirement
that "federally supported activities" must
not contribute to a violation of the Clean
Air Act.
The Environmental Defense Fund also
challenged the language in the EPA regulations indicating that only "major"
sources of emissions would be required to
conform, and that certain categories of
government actions would be exempt.
The court, relying on common law, held
that exceptions from statutory requirements
could be made "as an exercise of
agency power . . . [if] considered de
minimis." The court determined that the
exceptions in the EPA regulations could
be considered de minimis, and therefore,
were not in violation of the Clean Air Act.
Based on the above analysis, the
court denied the petitions for review.
- by Erick Roeder

Commonwealth of Virginia v. Browner,
No. 95-1052, 1996 WL 138507 (4th
Cir. Mar. 26, 1996)
The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) found that Virginia had failed to
comply with Title V of the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act (CAA). The
EPA stated that Virginia's proposed program for issuing air pollution permits did
not comply with Title V because the program did not provide for adequate judicial review of its permitting decisions.
Virginia challenged the EPA's finding and
petitioned for review before the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Virginia advanced three main arguments. First, it claimed that EPA misinterpreted the judicial review provisions of
Title V, and that Virginia had corrected
any defects in its proposal that would violate the amended CAA. Second, it

argued that the EPA's original rejection of
its State Implementation Plan (SIP) was
arbitrary and capricious. Lastly, Virginia
alleged that sections of Title V, including
its sanctioning provisions, were unconstitutional in that they wrongfully appropriate the state's legislative processes in
violation of the Tenth Amendment and the
Spending Clause of Article 1, § 8.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected each of Virginia's arguments.
First, the court denied Virginia's request
that the dispute be remanded to the EPA
for review, despite Virginia's assertion
that it had corrected all but one of the
alleged violations in its SIP. The court
held that the EPA could reject an entire
SIP based on just one defect. In addition, the court stated that the EPA had not
signed off on Virginia's newly-submitted
SIP as required by the CAA.
In denying Virginia's next claim, the
court stated that it must uphold EPA's conclusion that Virginia's proposed SIP judicial review provisions were inadequate
unless the EPA's finding was "arbitrary,
capricious .

..

or otherwise not in accor-

dance with law." The court stated that
the EPA's ruling withstood this standard of
review because Virginia's SIP did not provide judicial review of permitting decisions to all persons who would have
standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Virginia's SIP granted judicial
review only to "any owner aggrieved bV'
a permitting decision but did not provide
the same review to members of the public. The court noted that Article III standing was broader than the review Virginia
provided. The CAA required that standing be extended beyond aggrieved owners with a pecuniary interest to anyone
who could show: 1) actual or imminent
injury, 2) a causal connection between
the challenged conduct and the injury,
and 3) likelihood the injury would be redressed by favorable judicial action.
In its final argument, Virginia claimed
that Title V and its sanctions section invaded a state's right to determine its own
rules of standing for judicial review. The
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appellate court, however, held that Title V
was not unconstitutional because federal
law may induce state action in areas that
otherwise are beyond the regulatory
reach of Congress. In short, the court
stated, Virginia was blurring the lines between a federal statute designed merely
to induce state action as opposed to one
that actually coerced a state into exercising its sovereign power. The court held
that while CAA sanctions for noncompliance with judicial review provisions may burden states such as Virginia,
those sanctions amount to inducement,
not outright coercion.
Furthermore, the court stated that the
Commerce and Spending clauses of the
U.S. Constitution gave Congress the
power to withhold state highway funds
for non-compliance with the CAA, because Congressional efforts to eliminate
air pollution promoted the general welfare and also involved the regulation of
potentially-hazardous activities that could
cause air and water pollution across state
boundaries. In a final policy argument,
the court stated that the CAA sanctions
maintained "unity between regulation and
political accountability" because they
hold the federal government accountable
for its decisions in full view of the general
public.
- by Douglas Cohen

NEPA
Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley,
Nos.
95-35052,
95-34214,
95-35215, 1996 WL 165069 (9th Cir.
Apr. 10, 1996)
This decision consolidated three appeals, resulting from challenges to a decision by the Secretaries of Agriculture and
Interior (federal defendants) on April 13,
1994, that approved a plan to manage
federal lands containing spotted owl
habitat in the Pacific Northwest.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
first addressed appeals by the Native Forest Council, Forest Conservation Council
and Save the West (the environmental
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plaintiffs). The environmental plaintiff's
challenge concerned the district court's
grant of summary judgment affirming the
Record of Decision for Amendments to
Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management Planning Documents Within
Range of the Northern Spotted Owl.
In 1993, President Clinton established
the Forest Ecosystem Management Team
(FEMAT) to assist the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior in the formation of forest management plans for federal lands
in the Pacific Northwest. Pursuant to that
end, FEMAT narrowed the field of possible strategies to ten, and the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management
prepared an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) which covered all of these options. The Secretaries of Agriculture and
Interior adopted alternative number nine,
spawning this litigation.
The environmental plaintiffs argued
that the federal defendants failed to consider a "no action" alternative, thus violating the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), which requires that agencies
consider a reasonable range of alternatives. The Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit stated that the federal defendants
were under no obligation to consider
every conceivable alternative, such as
those alternatives that were inconsistent
with overall policy objectives or those alternatives that were unlikely to be implemented. The court noted that the federal
defendants had considered a "no harvest" option originally but abandoned it
early as inconsistent with the policy of
balancing competing land uses.
The instant court also addressed the
environmental plaintiffs' argument that the
selected alternative violated a mandate of
the National Forest Management Act
(NFMA), that species remain viable.
Once again, the court looked to overall
goals of the relevant acts and found that
compromise for multiple use was acceptable. The court noted the lower court's
explanation that an alternative offering a
higher likelihood of viability would preclude any multiple use. The court concluded that because there was no

evidence that the federal defendants overlooked relevant factors or made any clear
errors of judgment, they reasonably complied with the NFMA's viability mandate.
The court of appeals then addressed
the environmental plaintiffs' final argument regarding the first two appeals. In
essence, the environmental plaintiffs' contended that the preparation of the EIS did
not adequately consider the cumulative
environmental impacts associated with
the chosen alternative. Upon review, the
court stated that the Endangered Species
Act protected endangered species from
harm caused by habitat modification or
destruction, and that it was reasonable to
assume that non-federal land will be managed to avoid harm to the threatened
species. The court affirmed the district
court's judgment.
The court went on to decide a related
appeal, filed by the Northwest Forest Resource Council (Council). The Council
appealed the district court's entry of summary judgment for the federal defendants
on their cross-claims for declaratory relief.
The Council wished to litigate the challenges in the District of Columbia. The
court of appeals addressed the argument
that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
hear the cross-claims for declaratory judgment or alternatively abused its discretion
by exercising its jurisdiction.
The court stated that where jurisdiction
exists, the Declaratory Judgment Act (Act)
is intended to allow earlier access to the
courts to spare potential defendants from
the threat of litigation and to help defendants avoid a multiplicity of lawsuits. The
court found the cross-claim to be appropriate under the act in this action, since
the federal defendants were faced with
the possibility of different judgments on
the same issues and the expense of litigating the issues again in another forum.
The court of appeals, therefore, affirmed
the judgment of the district court.
- by Michael Hunter
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Western Radio Services Co., Inc. v.
Espy, 79 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 1996)
Western Radio Services (Western)
brought suit against the Department of
Agriculture, United States Forest Service,
and other defendants (the Service), claiming that the Service abused its discretion
when it granted Slater Communications
Corporation (Slater) a special use permit
to build a radio tower at Gray Butte in
the Ochoco National Forest in Oregon.
Western argued that the radio tower
caused interference with its broadcasts
and the grant of permit violated various
regulations, including the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and National Forest Management Act (NFMA).
Western's claim originally arose
when the Service allowed Slater to build
at Gray Butte. The Forest Supervisor denied Western's claim that Slater's tower
would result in radio frequency interference. Western appealed to the Regional
Forester, who upheld the decision but required meetings to be held between parties sharing the Gray Butte location to
insure that Slater's tower was built in the
best possible location. Western contended it never agreed to the current location. Western then filed this action in
district court alleging the permit violated
NEPA and NFMA, which grants the Service's authority. Western further claimed
that the Forest Service Manual (Manual)
and Forest Service Handbook (Handbook) were also "regulations" that the
Service had failed to comply with. The
district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the Service, holding that the
Service did not abuse its discretion in issuing Slater's permit, and that Western
lacked standing to challenge the permit
under NEPA.
After noting that it was proper for the
court to review the case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth District noted that it
may only overturn the Service's decision
if it found the decision to be arbitrary and
capricious. Here, the court stated that
arbitrary and capricious meant that the
agency relied on factors that Congress
did not intend, entirely failed to consider

important aspects, offered a explanation
countered by evidence, or offered a completely implausible justification. The court
also noted that it would only entertain allegations that the Service did not comply
with regulations if those regulations have
the force of law.
The court of appeals held that the
Handbook and Manual did not have the
force of law, nor did applicable code
sections adopt the Manual and Handbook by reference. The two-part "force
of law" test used by the court: 1) the
rules be substantive rather than interpretive; and 2) the agencies have conformed to procedural requirements in
promulgating the pronouncements in
question.
On review, the court found that the
Manual and Handbook did not meet the
first requirement because they establish
guidelines for Service authority, not binding limitations. The court noted that the
Manual and Handbook did not meet the
second requirement either because they
were not promulgated under a specific
grant of authority and in the manner proscribed by Congress; they were not published under the Administrative Procedure
Act, nor in the Federal Register or the
Code of Federal Regulations, were not
subject to notice and comment rule making, and were not promulgated under
some specific Congressional authority.
The court also dismissed Western's
argument that the Manual and Handbook
were incorporated by reference in other
Service regulations, because incorporation did not lend the Manual and Handbook substantive status if the Manual and
Handbook still lacked the elements from
the force of law test. Having decided
that the Manual and Handbook did not
have the force of law, the court found it
unnecessary to evaluate Western's allegation that the Service had gone beyond
the scope of its authority.
The court of appeals then denied
Western's claim that the Service had not
followed established Service guidelines
and therefore acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The code section gave the

discretionary instruction that the Service
should consider if new buildings will
cause interference with existing structures.
However, the court stated that since the
section was discretionary, even if the
Service had not acted upon it, the court
would have no authority. The court also
pointed out that the Service had actually
included a provision protecting against
interference in this particular permit grant,
even though there was no requirement to
do so, and no indication at the time that
there would be interference at all.
Finally, the court dismissed Western's
claim under NEPA. Distinguishing this
case from those where there is at least
some environmental harm in addition to
interference with radio broadcasts, the
court of appeals found that Western alleged only harm to the broadcasts, or
economic harm.
The court affirmed the summary judgment of the lower court.
-

by Kevin Murphy

CLEAN WATER ACT
Hughey v. JMS Development Corporotion, 78 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996)
Hughey, a homeowner in Gwinnett
County, Georgia, filed a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act (CWA) seeking
to enjoin JMS Development Corp. (IMS)
from discharging storm water runoff.
Hughey argued that JMS, the developer
of a residential subdivision in Gwinnett
County, was violating the CWA by allowing storm water runoff without possessing a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit setting
forth the conditions under which storm
water could be discharged.
At trial, the evidence showed that
JMS submitted its subdivision plans and
specifications to Gwinnett County for approval and obtained a county permit to
begin construction. In addition, a CWA
NPDES permit was not then available in
the State of Georgia. Nevertheless, the
district court's interpretation of the CWA
relied upon a "zero discharge" standard,
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how JMS was to do so. The court held
that the district court s injunction did not
contain an operative command capable
of enforcement, nor was it tailored to remedy specific harms rather than to enjoin
all possible breaches of the law.
Finally, the appellate court reversed
the district court s award of attorney fees
and costs to Hughey. Under the CWA s
citizen suit provision, a court may issue
erty in Gwinnett County, Georgia . . . if costs of litigation to any prevailing party.
such discharge would be in violation of However, the reviewing court held that
[CWA]." The court, also fined JMS for Hughey was not a prevailing party.
continuing violations of the CWA and Since the Eleventh Circuit did not find in
awarded Hughey attorney fees and favor of Hughey, it was inappropriate to
costs. From those orders and judgment of give such an award.
- by Constance S. Chandler
the district court, JMS appealed.
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, JMS argued that the
broad, generalized language of the in- Shady Valley Park & Pool, Inc. v. Fred
junction violated the standard of specific- Weber, Inc., 913 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. Ct.
ity required by Federal Rule of Civil App. 1995)
Gene Lambrich (Lambrich) purchased
Procedure 65(d). JMS s second contenShady
Valley Park & Pool, Inc., (Shady
tion was that it should not be punished for
failing to secure an NPDES permit when Valley), in .1965. Originally operating
no such permit was available. Finally, as a swimming pool, the property beJMS objected to the award of attorney came a fee fishing area around 1967.
Shady Valley raised numerous species of
fees and costs.
First, the appellate court determined fish, and high quality water was essential
that Congress could not have intended a to the success of both the fee fishing and
strict application of the zero discharge fish hauling businesses.
The Missouri Highway and Transporstandard when compliance is factually
impossible. The court further found that tation Commission (MHTC) hired Fred
once JMS began the development, com- Weber (Weber) to make improvements to
pliance would have been impossible. Missouri State Highway 21. The conThe evidence was uncontroverted that struction project involved two phases,
whenever it rained in Gwinnett County, with the entire project taking place on
some discharge was going to occur, re- property directly above that which Shady
gardless of efforts byJMS to prevent it. In Valley owned. The contract for both
addition, the court determined that Con- phases contained special provisions regress did not intend the zero discharge garding the Shady Valley property, which
standard to apply when: 1) a CWA stated that since the lakes on the Shady
NPDES permit was not available; 2) the Valley property were stocked with fish,
discharger was in good-faith compliance precautions would have to be taken to
with local pollution control requirements ensure that the lakes were protected from
that substantially mirrored the proposed mud and silt accumulation.
NPDES discharge standards; and 3) the
In September, 1987, Weber and his
discharges were minimal.
subcontractor began construction on
The court of appeals vacated the Phase 1 of the project. Weber, in implelower court's injunction, finding that the menting the plans of the MHTC, began
district court s order merely required JMS clearing the property and removing tree
to stop discharges, but failed to specify stumps and roots.
These operations
which absolutely prohibited the discharge
of any storm water byJMS in the absence
of an NPDES permit. The court ignored
testimony that some storm water discharge beyond the control of JMS would
naturally occur whenever it rained.
The district court issued a permanent
injunction ordering that JMS "not discharge storm water into the waters of the
United States from its development prop-
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involved stripping the ground to the bare
soil, and took place just above Shady
Valley's lakes. Construction for Phase II of
the project began in the fall of 1988. All
the drainage and silt from the second
phase traveled through the ditch systems
constructed during the first phase, despite
efforts to prevent mud and silt accumulation in the lakes.
As a result of the problems Shady Valley had in obtaining suitable water, the
operation also had difficulty holding an
inventory. The entire Shady Valley complex discontinued operations in October,
1991. Prior to the closing of the business, Lambrich tried to obtain relief from
Weber and the MHTC. Negotiations
proved unsuccessful, and Shady Valley
filed its original petition for relief from
Weber and the MHTC on June 18,
1990. An amended petition was also
filed, but was eventually dismissed.
Shady Valley charged the MHTC with
separate counts of trespass, inverse condemnation, nuisance and negligence.
The petition charged Weber with negligence, and also contained a third party
beneficiary contract claim and a request
for punitive damages.
The MHTC was severed from the
case against Weber, and the trial court
directed a verdict against Shady Valley
on the punitive damages and third-party
beneficiary contract claims. A verdict in
the amount of three million dollars was
entered in favor of Shady Valley on the
trespass and negligence claims. Weber
appealed the judgment, and Shady Valley cross-appealed.
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Eastern District affirmed the trial court's
judgment in all respects. In affirming the
decision, the court rejected Weber's contention that the "acceptance doctrine"
directly prohibited the imposition of any
liability. This doctrine states that once a
highway contractor's work has been accepted by the state, the contractor is not
liable to a third party with whom there is
no contractual relationship for injuries that
occur as a result of tortuous conduct. The
acceptance by the state may be
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constructive or practical, but must be
deemed by the court to have occurred in
some manner. The court of appeals held
that damage to the lakes occurred prior
to any conceivable acceptance by the
state. Therefore, the doctrine did not apply, and Weber was liable for the negligence and forts that occurred while in
possession of the property.
Weber also contended on appeal
that the trial court erred in giving an instruction that allowed the jury to provide
that Shady Valley could recover for "all
damages for all time." The instant court
rejected this contention on the basis that
Shady Valley's claims for recovery were
not for nuisance damages alone, but
were also for trespass. The court stated
that a trespasser is liable for damages for
any natural, direct, necessary and proximate consequences of his action. The
court held that the instruction was valid
when damage to the property went beyond mere property loss.
Weber further argued that the trial
court erred in not submitting two requested jury instructions. One instruction
would have allowed the jury to consider
any mitigating circumstances, and the
second instruction was on comparative
fault. On review, the court stated that the
burden of proof for mitigation of damages is on the defendant. The defendant
must show that the injured party had the
opportunity to mitigate and any reasonThe
able perspective consequences.
court also stated that since Weber presented no evidence that Shady Valley
had the opportunity to mitigate damages,
there was not an adequate showing.
Therefore, the court held that there was
no abuse of discretion in disallowing
Weber's offered instructions.
The final point the court analyzed on
appeal was the right of Shady Valley to
recover punitive damages. Shady Valley
contended that the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of Weber on
this issue. The court of appeals held that
the standard of review for a submissable
punitive damages claim was whether a
reasonable juror could have found that

Weber's conduct showed conscious disregard or complete indifference to the
interests of Shady Valley. The court found
that even though Weber's actions were
ineffective at controlling the mud and silt
accumulation, there was no conscious
disregard nor complete indifference to the
interests of Shady Valley. Therefore, Weber's activities did not rise to the level of
justifying punitive damages, and Shady
Valley's contention was denied.
- by Tricia Ann Baker

CONSTITUTION
City of Jefferson v. Missouri Dep't of
Natural Resources, 916 S.W.2d 794
(Mo. 1996)
The issue presented by this case was
whether Mo. Rev. Stat. § 260.325 was
unconstitutional, in light of a provision of
the Missouri Constitution found in Article X
Section
(Hancock Amendment).
260.325 required counties and cities
that were not members of solid waste
management districts, which had. populations of over 500 people, to submit a
new or revised solid waste plan that complied with § 260.220-.325. However,
the Hancock Amendment was violated if
both "(1) a new or increased activity or
service is required of a political subdivision by the State and (2) the political subdivision experiences increased costs in
performing the activity or service."
The circuit court first addressed this
controversy in City of Jefferson I, holding
that Jefferson City would experience increased costs in its attempt to comply
with § 260.325. As a city with a population of over 500 people, Jefferson City
would have been required to file a new
solid waste plan discussing the following:
the separation of household waste, the
reduction of solid waste placed in landfills, a timetable for such reduction, minimization of small quantities of hazardous
waste, and establishment of educational
programs. Therefore, the court enjoined
not only future enforcement of §
260.325, but also the development of

solid waste management plans meeting
the "Model Plan Guidelines for Solid
Waste Management." The Missouri Department of Natural Resources (MDNR)
and the State of Missouri appealed.
The Missouri Supreme Court analyzed
whether the increased cost to Jefferson
City was more than de minimis by examining specific evidence presented by the
city. Although MDNR argued that Jefferson City presented insufficient evidence
showing this increase, the court found
that Jefferson City's demonstration of cost
was adequate. The city's evidence included an estimation of costs "two to
three times" over what was spent on previous waste plans, due to the subsequent
need to employ additional engineers.
Therefore the court held that Jefferson City
need not comply with the mandate to submit a revised solid waste plan.
With respect to the state's enforcement of the statute against other political
subdivisions that had failed to prove the
existence of increased costs, the supreme
court reversed the lower court's decision.
Absent actual proof of higher costs resulting from the plan's development, a city
or county must still meet the requirements
established in § 260.325.
- by Lynette McCloud

OTHER
American States Insurance Co. v.
Nethery, 79 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 1996)
In 1991, Mary Jane Nethery, (Nethery) hired DAPA, Inc., (DAPA) to paint
portions of the interior of her home.
Nethery claimed she explicitly contracted
for the repairs to be made with special
paint that would be "non-toxic" to her,
because of her hypersensitivity to chemicals. However, DAPA used regular industry paint in glue in Nethery's home.
She specifically contended that she was
allergic to the chemical 1, 1,1 trichloroethane, (1,1,1 tca) found in the paint
DAPA used, and that the fumes from the
materials injured her and caused the loss
of part of her home. She sued DAPA, its
DMELPR
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president and the franchisor, (the insureds) alleging breach of contract, gross
negligence, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The insureds looked
to their insurer, American States, for defense and coverage of Nethery's claims.
American States filed the declaratory action involved in the instant case.
The district court held that American
States did not have a duty to defend
against Nethery's claims for breach of
contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress; however, it did have a
duty to defend against her gross negligence claim, and the claim was not
barred from coverage by a pollution exclusion clause contained in the policy.
American States appealed, contending
that the absolute pollution exclusion did
apply to bar Nethery's claim.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that if an insurance policy is unambiguous, its terms must be given their
plain meaning and enforced as written.
Unless the lower court were to find the
exclusion ambiguous on its face, the court
would lack the prerogative to engraft limitations on the exclusion as it appears in
the policy.
The instant court determined that
American States pollution exclusion
clearly applied in this case. The exclusion defined "pollutant as "any . . . gaseous . . . irritant or contaminant, including
. . . vapor . . . fumes . . . and chemi-

cals." Accordingly, the paint fumes in
Nethery's claim fell under the definition of
gaseous substances, vapors, and fumes,
while the 1,1,1 tca in the paint was
plainly a chemical.
The insureds suggested that the fumes
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did not constitute an "irritant," because
they do not normally inflict injury. The
court quickly dismissed the argument, saying that an irritant was a substance that
produced a particular effect, not one that
generally or probably caused such effects. Further, cases cited by the insureds
concerning the ambiguity of the exclusion
clause were unpersuasive. The -court of
appeals concluded that American State's
absolute
pollution
exclusion was
unambiguous and excluded Nethery's
claim.
- by Debbie Martinez

Colonial Properties, Inc. v. Vogue
Cleaners, Inc., 77 F.3d 384 (Ala.
1996)
The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama addressed
the question of whether improperly disposed toxic wastes gave a landlord a
trespass cause of action against a tenant
for trespass to a common area. This was
a question of first impression in Alabama
and was reviewed by the United States
Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
The case arose from Vogue Cleaners', Inc., (Vogue Cleaners) disposal of
toxic waste generated by a dry cleaning
operation.
Vogue generated several
toxic wastes, most of which were properly disposed of by disposal companies.
However, toxic waste containing perchloroethylene was not disposed by these
companies, rather it was poured onto a
curb behind the business. This resulted in
several incidents in which workers were
burned by groundwater contaminated
with perchloroethylene. The Emergency

Response Management and Training Corporation and the Alabama Department of
Environmental Management were called
to the scene to contain the waste and
assess the damage.
As a result, the landlord of the building, Colonial Properties, Inc., (Colonial
Properties) filed suit against Vogue Cleaners under several theories to recover damages. At issue in the instant case was
whether the district court properly held in
favor of Colonial Properties for the claim
of trespass against Vogue Cleaners for
damage to the common area contaminated by the toxic waste. Vogue Cleaners maintained the action was improper
since Colonial Properties did not have
exclusive control over the contaminated
area, thus preventing recovery for trespass damages. Colonial Properties argued that it needed only to exercise
"sufficient" possession and control over a
common area to entitle a landlord to a
trespass cause of action. The district
court determined that the later was the
proper reasoning, and would apply were
the Alabama Supreme Court to address
the issue.
Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit
pointed out that since this is a case of first
impression, the district court should not
have speculated as to how the Alabama
Supreme Court would have ruled if confronted with the issue. Accordingly, the
court certified the case to the Alabama
Supreme Court to answer the question of
whether the facts of this case give rise to
a trespass cause of action by a landlord
against a tenant for damages to a common area.
- by Marc Poston

